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1Non-technical summary
During periods of economic downturn or stress in nancial markets the ef-
fects of scal developments on economic activity might be dierent from what is
usually observed in good or normal times. We can perceive \bad times" as periods
of economic downturn or stress in nancial markets. Evidence shows that economic
downturns are often associated with periods of nancial stress or even with nancial
crisis. During such periods, the quality of nancial institutions' assets deteriorates,
as the share of non-performing loans increases and negative sentiments in the mar-
kets depress the value of other nancial assets. In some cases, the disruptions in
nancial markets or problems in the banks' balance sheets may trigger a recession by
reducing the ow of credit to the other sectors. Therefore, it is important to assess
the eects of scal developments and policies during the periods of market stress to
check, whether there are some non-linearities at play and if the scal multipliers are
dierent.
In this paper we contribute to the scally related vector autoregression (VAR)
literature by estimating the eects of scal shocks using a threshold VAR approach
(TVAR), including a measure representing nancial instability, the Financial Stress
Index. More specically, we employ a quarterly dataset, for the US, the UK, Ger-
many and Italy, for the period 1980:4-2009:4, encompassing macro, scal and nancial
variables. The application of a nonlinear framework with regime switching was mo-
tivated by the lively debate on the ability of scal policy to shorten recessions and
to facilitate a subsequent recovery. Furthermore, the identied periods of nancial
stress are also characterised by lower output growth and in a number of cases coincide
with recessions.
The use of quarterly scal data is another relevant contribution in this context.
Moreover, according to our knowledge there have been no attempts to investigate
empirically the eects of scal developments associated with periods of nancial crises
within a multi-equation framework, which is the issue addressed in this paper.
Our analysis reveals several results worthwhile mentioning: (i) the use of a non-
linear framework with regime switches, determined by a nancial stress indicator, is
corroborated by nonlinearity tests; (ii) the responses of economic growth to a scal
shock are mostly positive in both nancial stress regimes; (iii) nancial stress has a
negative eect on output growth and it increases the government debt-to-GDP ratio;
(iv) the nonlinearity in the response of output growth to a scal shock is mainly
associated with dierent behaviour across regimes, while nonlinearities caused the
by size and sign of the shocks are small; (v) the size of the scal multipliers evolved
over time and is higher than average during the most recent economic crisis in all
countries, except in the United Kingdom.
Therefore, we have found evidence of nonlinearities in the eects of a scal shock
on economic activity depending on the initial conditions, determined by the existence
of nancial stress, diverse levels of government indebtedness, and, of course implicitly
assumed dierent monetary policy behaviour. In addition, both multipliers and the
nature of these nonlinearities vary across countries and evolve over time.
21 Introduction
During periods of economic downturn or stress in nancial markets the eects of scal
developments on economic activity might be dierent from what is usually observed
in good times. We can perceive \bad times" as periods of economic downturn or stress
in nancial markets. Evidence shows that economic downturns are often associated
with periods of nancial stress or even with nancial crisis. During such periods, the
quality of nancial institutions' assets deteriorates, as the share of non-performing
loans increases and negative sentiments in the markets depress the value of other
nancial assets. In some cases, the disruptions in nancial markets or problems in
the banks' balance sheets may trigger a recession by reducing the ow of credit to
the other sectors. It is then important to assess the eects of scal developments
and policies during the periods of market stress to check, whether there are some
non-linearities at play and if the scal multipliers are dierent. Therefore, we focus
in this study on the interactions between scal and nancial developments in times
of nancial instability.
Certainly, the relation between nancial instability and economic policy can be
two-sided. On the one hand, irrespectively of the causes of nancial instability, policy
makers may try to soften its eect on the economy. On the other hand, so-called
\bad" policies can also contribute to nancial instability. For instance, a situation of
large government indebtedness might cause a loss of condence in the ability of the
government to pay back orderly its the outstanding stock of debt, subsequent drops
in government bond prices, rises in sovereign yields, and an economic downturn.
Hence, it is relevant to examine whether and how the eects of scal developments
on economic activity dier in times of nancial instability.
In this paper we contribute to the scally related vector autoregression (VAR)
literature by estimating the eects of scal shocks using a threshold VAR approach,
including a measure representing nancial instability, namely the Financial Stress
Index (Cardarelli et al., 2010). More specically we employ a quarterly dataset, for
the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Italy, for the period 1980:4-2009:4, encompassing
macro, scal and nancial variables. Therefore the use of quarterly scal data is
another relevant contribution in this context. Moreover, according to our knowledge,
there have been no attempts to investigate empirically the eects of scal develop-
ments associated with periods of nancial crises within a multi-equation framework,
which is the issue addressed in this paper.
Our analysis reveals several results worthwhile mentioning: (i) the use of a non-
linear framework with regime switches, determined by a nancial stress indicator, is
corroborated by nonlinearity tests; (ii) the responses of economic growth to a scal
shock are mostly positive in both nancial stress regimes; (iii) nancial stress has a
negative eect on output growth and it worsens the scal position; (iv) the nonlin-
earity in the response of output growth to a scal shock is mainly associated with
dierent behaviour across regimes, while nonlinearities caused the by size and sign
of the shocks are small; (v) the size of the scal multipliers evolved over time and is
higher than average during the current crisis in all countries, except in the United
3Kingdom.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two reviews the related literature.
Section three explains the methodology. Section four gives a brief overview of scal
developments in the countries covered in the analysis. Section ve conducts the
empirical analysis and reports the VAR results. Finally, section six concludes.
2 Related literature
2.1 Fiscally related VARs
VAR models, in addition to the New Keynesian DSGE models, have become the most
popular tool for investigating the eects of monetary policy during the 1990s, and a
number of stylized facts have been broadly identied. In response to a contractionary
shock in the short-term interest rate, (i) real GDP declines with a hump-shape pat-
tern, with a maximum decline occurring between one and one and half year, (ii) the
price level declines persistently, and (iii) there is an evidence for a strong liquidity
eect, that is, the non-borrowed reserves drop in response to an increase of interest
rates. A summary of the research in this eld can be found in Christiano, et al.
(1999).
However, no such broad consensus has emerged from the research on the eects
of scal policy, notably regarding the qualitative responses of macroeconomic aggre-
gates to changes in government expenditures or revenues. In this context, the main
diculties come from the approaches used to identify the changes in scal policy,
since both government expenditures and revenues, to some extent, automatically re-
spond to uctuations in economic activity and thus these uctuations need to be
distinguished from deliberate policy changes. It is possible to separate these eects
using estimated elasticities of tax revenues and government expenditures with regard
to output developments or to use external information such as the expected contem-
porary eects of the scal variables. Nevertheless, the dierences in the identication
schemes in the VAR analysis often lead to dierent results. For instance, van Brus-
selen (2010) provides a broad overview of the eectiveness of scal policy, and an
evaluation of scal multipliers notably in several VAR models.
Caldara and Kamps (2008) compared the four existing approaches to identify
scal policy shocks in VAR models using a dataset for the United States: (i) the
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) following Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and Perotti (2005) with calibrated sizes of the automatic stabilizers, (ii) the recur-
sive identication scheme with the Choleski decomposition,1 (iii) the sign-restriction
approach proposed for the analysis of monetary policy by Uhlig (2005) and applied
by Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and (iv) the so called "narrative approach" assigning
dummy variables associated with periods that are known for exogenous changes in
1The ordering used in these studies is as follows: government expenditures, G, revenues, T, gross
domestic product, Y (all in real per capita terms and natural logs; sometimes the share of G and
T on Y is used and they are often augmented for transfers and interest payments), ination, 
(measured as the GDP deator), and short-term interest rate i.
4scal policy, related to the increases in military build-ups. The authors argue that
dierent identication and calibration schemes lead to similar results as far as the
eect of government expenditures is concerned, e.g. the shock to government expen-
ditures is likely to increase output. However, results are strongly diverging regarding
the responses to changes in taxes.2
Romer and Romer (2007) applied a narrative approach in a similar fashion as they
did in their 1989 paper on monetary policy. They went through the Congressional
records and presidential speeches to identify both timing and size of the changes
in taxation. Based on this identication, they nd that tax increases were highly
contractionary with multipliers that reached the value of three. This value is much
higher than the values obtained from other VARs which are concentrated around
one. Such discrepancy was explained by Favero and Giavazzi (2009) who argued that
the results of Romer and Romer are caused by their estimation method based on
one equation. After using the shocks by Romer and Romer within a multivariate
framework, Favero and Giavazzi obtained results similar to those from traditional
scal VARs.3
The scal VAR approach based either on the SVAR or on the recursive identi-
cation was applied for several countries in the European Union. Van Aarle et al.
(2003) estimated the eects of scal and monetary policy for the members of the
Economic and Monetary Union and found signicant dierences in reactions among
the individual countries of the euro area. Muscatelli et al. (2002) found a signicant
decrease in the responsiveness of the scal policy variables in the U.S. since 1979,
and similar decreases were also reported for Italy, Germany, France and the United
Kingdom.
For Germany, Heppke-Falk et al. (2006), using a VAR approach, mention that
government expenditure shocks increase output and private consumption on impact
with low statistical signicance, while they decrease insignicantly private invest-
ment. They also found for government investment - in contrast to government con-
sumption - a positive output eect, which is statistically signicant until 12 quarters
ahead. In addition, anticipated expenditure shocks have signicant eects on output
when the shock is realized, but not in the period of anticipation. The authors claim
that the eects of expenditure shocks are only short-lived in Germany and govern-
ment net revenue shocks do not aect output with statistical signicance. However,
they provide evidence that direct taxes lower output signicantly, while small indirect
tax revenue shocks have little eect. Moreover, the compensation of public sector
employees is equally not eective in stimulating the economy.
For Italy, Giordano et al. (2007), also within a VAR framework, found that a
shock to government purchases of goods and services has a sizeable and robust eect
on economic activity: an exogenous 1% (in terms of private GDP) shock increases
2For the case of the US Ramey and Shapiro (1999) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999)
used one-period dummy variables for 1965Q1 and for the 1980Q1. Caldara and Kamps (2008) added
one more for 2001Q3.
3 In a somewhat similar vein, Agnello and Cimadomo (2009) provided an analysis for the European
Union.
5private real GDP by 0.6% after 3 quarters. The response declines to zero after two
years, reecting with a lag the low persistence of the shock. The authors also mention
that the eects on employment, private consumption and investment are positive for
Italy. In contrast, changes of public sector wages have no signicant eect on output,
while the eects on employment turn negative after two quarters. Shocks to net
revenue were found to have negligible eects on all the variables.4
The baseline specication was extended for an analysis of the impact of the ex-
change rate (Monacelli and Perotti, 2006) and for government debt (Favero and
Giavazzi, 2007 and Afonso and Sousa, 2009a). Afonso and Sousa (2009a, b) used
quarterly scal data from the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Italy along with the
feedback from government debt, and also included the eects on asset markets in a
Bayesian VAR model.
For instance, Afonso and Sousa (2009b) using a Bayesian SVAR model provide
some evidence that the government spending shocks have, inter alia, in general a small
eect on real GDP; do not impact signicantly on private consumption and have a
negative eect on private investment in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Italy. On
the contrary; they found that government revenue shocks have a positive (although)
lagged eects on GDP and private investment. Interestingly, they found that when
the debt dynamics is explicitly taken into account, (long-term) interest rates and
GDP become more responsive and the eects of scal policy on these variables also
become more persistent. Moreover, the results from Afonso and Sousa (2009b) also
provide weak evidence of stabilizing eects of the debt level on the primary budget
balance. They also nd that government spending shocks, in general, have a positive,
but small eect on GDP and also uncover a crowding out eect, which is present in
all four countries.
Kirchner, Cimadomo and Hauptmeier (2010) use time-varying structural VAR
techniques in the euro area for the period 1980-2008. They report that the short-run
eectiveness of government spending in stabilizing real GDP and private consumption
has increased until the end-1980s but it has decreased thereafter, and that government
spending multipliers at longer horizons have declined substantially due to higher
government debt-to-GDP ratios.
Regarding the possibility of negative scal spending multipliers, and the so-called
non-Keynesian eects of scal policy, several authors have argued along those lines.
For instance, it has been mentioned that high government debt implies additional
scal stress and a higher probability of higher taxes in the future (see, Alesina and
Perotti, 1996, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1998, 2005, and Mitra, 2006). Therefore, higher
private savings may arise and lower output, and thus the eects of increased gov-
ernment expenditure on output might be negative. In addition, there is also some
evidence of expansionary scal contractions, the most prominent examples are Den-
mark in 1993-1995 and Ireland in 1985-1988. Rzonca and Cizkowitz (2005) identied
4More recently, Amisano at al. (2009) estimated a time-varying VAR model to assess the Italian
relative performance compared to the rest of the euro area, originally including the public debt-to-
GDP ratio, which was dropped for the purpose of their study.
6a similar pattern in the Central and Eastern European countries that have entered
the EU in 2004-2006. However, Afonso (2010) reports that the empirical evidence
for the EU15 countries is quite diverse in this respect, notably with alternative de-
nitions of scal consolidation episodes.
2.2 Fiscal policy and nancial instability
The eects of scal policy can dier in times of nancial instability. This links with
the Keynesian-like story about countercyclical economic policy, and the possible pos-
itive impacts of scal stimuli. The idea is that the government steps in to compensate
the decline in private sector demand in order to stabilize aggregate demand. Almunia
et al. (2009), who compared the policies during the Great Depression and the 2008-09
crisis concluded that when scal policy was used in the 1930s it worked, while the
evidence for the eectiveness of monetary policy is rather mixed.
Fiscal policy can contribute to nancial instability if, for instance, scal stress
and the issuance of substantial amounts of sovereign debt can cause a potential scal
and/or nancial crisis. In particular, unsustainable scal policies may undermine
sovereign debt credibility and nancial markets may refuse to buy new government
debt, while transactions in the secondary market may also become less frequent.
The inability to sell government bonds reduces its liquidity and weakens the balance
sheet of the banks and of other nancial institutions that hold government debt. The
balance sheet losses related to the price drops in government debt securities aect
negatively the lending capacities of the banks, which consequently might reduce the
ow of credit to the private sector. Moreover, some related discussion drawing on the
scal theory of price level (Leeper, 1991, Sims, 1994, and Woodford, 1994, 1995), and
its application to Krugman's model of nancial crisis (1979) as introduced in Daniel
(2001) and Corsetti and Mackowiak (2006) also highlights such possible links.
2.3 Fiscal policy and nancial instability: empirics
The literature dealing with the eects of scal policy during periods of nancial stress
is relatively scarce, but growing. Baldacci et al. (2008) tried to answer the question
of whether scal policy might shorten the recession caused by banking crisis. Using
OLS estimation and truncated Logit on a dataset containing 118 banking crises in 99
countries 1980-2000, they have found that scal policy responses are signicant for
the duration of a nancial crisis, and that the composition of the scal package is a
key to success. In this respect their results are in line with Blanchard et al. (2009)
who tried to summarize the policy recommendations from the empirical literature in
order to give guidelines for the construction of scal stimuli packages that had been
prepared at that time.
By contrast, Bouthevillain and Dufr enot (2010) who used a Markov switching
model with time-varying probabilities within a single-equation framework have not
7found such dierences in the eciency of scal policy in France. Similarly Afonso,
Gr uner and Kolerus (2010), using a panel of OECD and non-OECD countries, for the
period, could not reject the hypothesis that the eects of scal policy are essentially
the same in the absence and during a nancial crisis
Several papers also address nancial instability in a SVAR context: Balke (2000),
Atanasova (2003), Li and St-Amant (2008) and Berkelmans (2005). For instance,
Berkelmans (2005) included a variable representing credit frictions in a small SVAR
model of the Australian economy and has shown that monetary policy might in this
case play a stabilizing role and it can reduce the eects of credit shocks on output.
Using a threshold vector autoregression with credit conditions as a threshold
variable, Balke (2000) has shown that the U.S. output responds more to monetary
policy in a credit-rationed regime. Atanasova (2003) analyzed the impact of credit
frictions on business cycles dynamics in the U.K. and her results in many respects
conrm the conclusions by Balke (2000). Finally, Li and St-Amant (2008) estimated a
threshold vector autoregression for the monetary transmission mechanism in Canada
with an indicator of nancial stress (Illing-Liu, 2006) as a threshold variable, and
have estimated explicitly the nonlinear properties of the system. Their ndings indi-
cated that there are nonlinear eects of contractionary and expansionary shocks and
that the large contractionary shocks increase the likelihood of moving to high stress
regime. Furthermore, the high stress regime is in their dataset typically associated
with weaker output growth, higher ination and higher interest rates. However, and
as far as we can tell, there are no studies that investigate empirically the eects of
scal developments associated with periods of nancial crises within a multi-equation
framework, and that is precisely what we do in this paper.
3 Methodology
3.1 Threshold Vector Autoregression
In this paper we follow the approach used by Balke (2000) and Li and St-Amant
(2008) for the estimation of a threshold vector autoregression (TVAR). Thus, we
include a threshold variable in the scal VAR, for which we have chosen the nancial
stress index (FSI), introduced by the IMF and described in Cardarelli, Elekdag and
Lall (2009).
The TVAR model has a number of interesting features that make it attractive for
our purposes. First, it is a relatively simple way to capture possible nonlinearities such
as asymmetric reactions to shocks or the existence of multiple equilibria. Because the
eects of the shocks are allowed to depend on the size and the sign of the shock, and
also on the initial conditions, the impulse response functions are no longer linear, and
it is possible to distinguish, for instance, between the eects of scal developments
under dierent nancial stress regimes.
Second, another advantage of the TVAR methodology is that the variable by
which dierent regimes are dened can itself be an endogenous variable included in
the VAR. Therefore, this makes it possible that regime switches may occur after the
8shock to each variable. In particular, the scal policy shock might either boost the
output or increase the nancial stress conditions that harm the prospects of economic
growth, and the overall eect GDP of a scal expansion might became negative.
The threshold VAR can be specied as follows:
Yt = A1Yt + B1(L)Yt 1 + (A2Yt + B2(L)Yt 1)I[st d > ] + Ut (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, I is an indicator function that takes
the value of 1 if, in our case, the nancial stress is higher than the threshold value ,
and 0 otherwise. The time lag d was set to 1. B1(L) and B2(L) are lag polynomial
matrices, A1Yt and A2Yt represent the contemporaneous terms, because contempo-
raneous eects might also dier across the regimes. Ut are structural disturbances.
We assume that the matrices A1 and A2 have a recursive structure.
We have used a recursive identication scheme for the VAR and included the
following variables: GDP growth (y), ination (), the scal variable (f), the short-
term interest rate (i), and the indicator for nancial market conditions (s), for which
we will use the Financial Stress Indicator (FSI) presented in section 5.2. The VAR
model in standard form can be written as:
Yt = c +
p X
i=1
ViYt i + t (2)
where Yt denotes the vector of the m endogenous variables given by Yt = [yttftitst]0,
c is a (5x1) vector of intercept terms, V is the matrix of autoregressive coecients of
order (5x5), and t is the vector of random disturbances.
This particular ordering reects some assumptions about the links in the economy.
We order the FSI last which implies that the FSI reacts contemporaneously to all
variables in the system. We assume that all new changes in both macroeconomic
aggregates and economic policy that occur during one quarter are transmitted to
nancial markets within this quarter. The ordering of the scal variable after output
is motivated by the need to identify the eects of automatic stabilizers in the economy.
Hence, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we assume that all reactions of scal
policy within each quarter (e.g. changes in government debt) are purely automatic
because of implementation lags of scal policy measures. The interest rate shows up
after the scal variable since the short-term interest rate can react contemporaneously
to scal policy, but not vice versa.
The lag length of the endogeneous variables, p, is determined by the usual in-
formation criteria (Schwarz SIC), which gives a larger penalty to the number of
coecients estimated in the model, but we use only one or two lags given the low
number of observations in the high stress regime. The main reason is that namely
within the high nancial stress regime the number of observations is too low to allow
estimating a VAR model with ve variables and the conventionally used four lags.
We tested whether the threshold indicator is statistically signicant or not. If
the threshold values  were known, the conventional F-test for the null hypothesis
9A2 = B2(L) = 0 would give reliable results. However, in our case the threshold value
is not known a priori,5 and the testing procedure involves non-standard inference,
because  is not identied under the null hypothesis of no threshold.
Therefore, rst, the TVAR model is estimated for all possible values of  (to avoid
over-tting, the possible values were set so that at least 15% of the observations
plus the number of coecients is included in each regime), and the values of the
Wald statistics testing the hypothesis of no dierence between regimes are stored.
Second, we constructed three test statistics, one with the maximum value of the Wald
statistics (sup-Wald), another one with its average (avg-Wald) and the nal one with
the sum of exponential Wald statistics (exp-Wald). These values are then compared
with the critical values obtained through simulating the empirical distribution, as
in Hansen (1996). The estimated thresholds were those that maximized the log
determinant of the structural residuals Ut.
3.2 Nonlinear impulse responses
In a linear model, the impulse responses can be derived directly from the estimated
coecients and the estimated responses are symmetric both in terms of the sign and
of the size of the structural shocks. Furthermore, these impulse responses are constant
over time as the covariance structure does not change. However, these convenient
properties do not hold within the class of nonlinear models as shown by Potter (1994)
and Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). The moving average representation of the
TVAR is nonlinear in the structural disturbances Ut, because some shocks may lead
to switches between regimes, and thus their Wold decomposition does not exist.
Consequently, in contrast to linear models, we cannot construct the impulse responses
as the paths the variables follow after an initial shock, assuming that no other shock
hits the system. To cope with these issues, Koop-Pesaran and Potter (1996) proposed
nonlinear impulse response functions dened as the dierence between the forecasted
paths of variables with and without a shock to a variable of interest.





where Yt+k is a vector of variables at horizon k, 
t 1 is the information set avail-
able before the time of shock t. This formulation implies that the impulse response
functions depend on the initial conditions and that there is no restriction regarding
the symmetry of the shocks.
Therefore, in order to get the complete information about the dynamics of the
model, the impulse responses have to be simulated for various sizes and for the signs
of the shocks. The algorithm proceeds as follows. First, the shocks for the periods
from 0 to q are drawn from the residuals of the estimated VAR model. Then, for
5Cardarelli et al. (2010) suggest the value of two for the FSI to distinguishe the periods of high
and low stress,. Their judgement is based on the experience that such identication of stress periods
mimics well the historical episodes of nancial instability.
10each initial value that is, for each point of our sample, this sequence of shocks is fed
through the model to produce forecasts conditional on initial conditions. These steps
are repeated for the same initial condition and the same set of residuals except for
the shock to the variable of interest, which is set to +/- 1 standard error and +/- 2
standard errors at time 0.
Second, we can calculate the forecasts conditional on the shocks and on the initial
conditions with and without an additional shock at t = 0, and the dierence between
these two is the impulse response function. This procedure is replicated 500-times
for each initial condition, and then we compute averages over the initial conditions
from each regime to get the average impulse responses for both regimes.6
Because the number of observations in the high stress regime is rather low (ranging
from 26 to 45), following Koop et al. (1996) we derive the condence bands from the
quantiles of the distribution of the average impulse responses rather than assuming
normality.
4 Fiscal developments' overview
Figure 1 provides some evidence about scal policies in the U.S., the U.K., Germany
and Italy in the period 1970-2009,7 based on the annual national accounts data
from the European Commission Ameco database. In order to capture the main
scal developments during this period we plot two charts: the rst one with the
general government debt-to-GDP ratio on the left-hand side axis and with government
revenue and expenditure ratios on the right-hand side axis; the second one with the
general government balance on the left-hand side axis and government debt on the
right-hand side axis.
In the U.S., the periods with high nancial stress broadly correspond to re-
cessions. This is the case in particular for the recessions identied by the NBER
between 1981Q3-1982Q4, 1990Q3-1991Q1, 2001Q1-2001Q4 and the latest recession
that started in 2007Q4. However, the nancial stress was identied also in the non-
recession periods in 1987Q3, 1988Q1 and 1999Q2. The stress in the nancial markets
in 1987Q3 is related to the event \Black Monday", 19 October 1987, when the stock
market in Hong Kong crashed and the eects spread globally. The second non-
recession period of tension in 1988Q1 could be linked to the savings and loan crisis
in the US. In that year, several banks located mainly in Texas and California went
under (e.g. First Republic Bank, American Savings and Loan Bank and First City
National Bank).
The government debt ratio was gradually declining until 1981 when a recession
hit the U.S. economy and the debt ratio started to increase. In August 1982, the
Congress approved the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act and the previous
6We estimated the VAR with WinRATS using a code provided by Nathan Balke, which we
modied for our purposes. Further details are provided in Appendix A.1 .
7See van Riet (ed.) (2010) for more details on scal policy in the euro area during the 2008-2009
crisis.
11tax cuts, which were implemented in the Economic Recovery Tax Act in 1981, were
reversed. The recession nished in the autumn of 1982, but the debt ratio continued
to increase until 1990 when another recession occurred. In the autumn of 1990, the
U.S. government enacted legislation which targeted a cumulative decit reduction of
about USD500 billion over ve years. In addition, the government improved also
the scal framework and prepared the Budget Enforcement Act, which introduced
new scal rules to limit future budget decits and discretionary expenditures. The
recession nished in the spring of 1991 and the debt-to-GDP ratio peaked two years
after, in 1993, at about 72%.
The following recovery brought the debt ratio on a declining path that lasted until
2001 when a recession emerged and contributed to the ensuing scal deterioration.
Despite the fact that this recession was over already by the end of the same year, the
government debt ratio gradually increase to 62% of GDP in 2007, when the subprime
debt crisis severely aected the U.S. economy. In 2008, the U.S. administration
faced a serious recession and adopted scal stimulus packages consisting of federal
tax cuts and spending increases of about 5% of GDP. As a consequence, the general
government decit jumped to about 11% of GDP in 2009, the highest number since
1970 and well above the decits of 5.4% of GDP in 1983 and 5.7% of GDP in 1992,
which can be linked to previous recessions.
Interestingly, for the U.S. Favero and Giavazzi (2007) point to dierent eects
of exogenous tax policy shocks on output in the period 1980-2006, when compared
to the previous period. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the contractionary eect of
a tax hike was larger when monetary policy shocks, government spending, and oil
prices were endogeneized in a model that included the level of the debt and the
government intertemporal budget constraint. Since the beginning of the 1980s, when
the burden of debt stabilization falls on expenditure, an exogenous increase in taxes
was compensated by a subsequent expenditure accommodation. This could explain
why, analyzing the eects of shocks in a model with endogenous monetary policy,
government spending, oil prices, and scal policy, produced much smaller output
eects. Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argued that in fact since the beginning of the
1980s, an initial positive tax shock is accompanied by further tax changes in the
opposite direction in the U.S. Following the initial shock taxes decline and the eect
on the budget is compensated by increases in spending.
In the U.K., government debt had been continuously declining from high levels
of around 80% at the beginning of the 1970s to around 33% in 1990. A particularly
strong scal consolidation was carried out in 1988 and 1989 when the scal balance
recorded surpluses of about 0.5 and 0.8% of GDP, respectively.
However, the orientation of British scal policy has changed several times since
the 1970s. In the 1970s, scal policy was the key policy instrument used for aggregate
demand management. When a new conservative government took oce in 1979 Key-
nesianism was replaced by monetarism as the leading economic paradigm. The scal
policy strategy changed and focused on reducing the size of the government in the
economy in addition to suppressing the role of scal policy in demand management.
In Germany it is possible to identify a few periods of scal consolidation episodes,
12Figure 1: General government debt, revenue, expenditure and scal balance
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13notably the period 1982-83 when the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance
improved more signicantly (see also Figure 1 for the overall scal balance). The
debt ratio increased gradually from a very low level, less than 20% of GDP in 1970,
to about 70% of GDP over the sample period with only four relatively short periods
of debt ratio reduction in 1979, around 1989-1991, in 2000-2001 and 2006-2007 which
coincide with the peaks of the business cycle. In 1979, the real GDP growth rate
reached almost 5% and in 1990 peaked at 5.25% in West Germany. However, the
period which followed the German reunication in 1990, in which the exchange rate
stress component of FSI was particularly high, must be interpreted with caution,
because the German economy had to cope with the economic transition of the former
East Germany from planned to market economy. The economic transition required
large amounts of public spending which stimulated an economic boom in several
German regions. The following peaks of real GDP growth rate that led to GDP
ratio reductions were recorded in 2000 and 2006 when the growth rate reached 3.2%.
From a scal policy perspective, important changes followed the ambitious and large
tax reform in 2000 in which the German government passed the most ambitious tax
reform and the tax burden was reduced for both individuals and companies. As a
consequence, the revenue-to-GDP ratio decline by almost 3 p.p. of GDP between
1999 and 2008. The changes in the German scal policies are more complex due to
scal federalism, where scal decisions of local governments play a more important
part.
In Italy, the debt ratio increased from about 37% of GDP in 1970 to about 122%
of GDP in 1994, then declined to about 104% of GDP by 2004 and further increased
to 115% of GDP in 2009. This was mainly due to a more relaxed scal policy in
the 1980s with the occurrence of budget decits of 10-12% of GDP each year. The
consolidation eort started to materialize in 1995 when the debt ratio declined by
0.3% of GDP. One of the main drivers of the Italian scal consolidation in the 1990s
was the eort to full the Maastricht scal criteria, which are necessary to qualify for
the euro area membership. For more details on scal consolidation process that was
characterised by a large number of corrective measures with only temporary eects,
see, for instance, Balassone et al. (2002).
The period of scal prudence between 1995 and 2004 delivered a notable reduc-
tion in the government debt ratio, which declined by about 18 p.p. during that
period. This reduction of government debt decreased, inter alia, government interest
expenditures from typically around 11-12% of GDP in the 1980s to less than 5% of
GDP since 2004. The interest payments usually constituted a substantial part of
government expenditures in the past. For example in the 1980s, the interest expen-
ditures corresponded to about 70% of the overall scal decit and in the beginning of
the 1990s, the ratio of government interest expenditures to GDP typically exceeded
the scal decit ratio, allowing the delivery of primary budget surpluses. In those
years, the nancing of government interest expenditures consumed about 1/3 of total
government revenues.
Contrary to the German experience, where the debt reduction occurs in a short
two-year period that reect mostly the business cycle, the debt reduction in Italy has
14a dierent pattern mainly due to the downward trend in nominal interest rates and
consolidation eorts in mid-1990s (see Figure 1). A similar patter can be found in
the UK, where the debt ratio declined in almost twenty consecutive years since 1970
with only one interruption of this declining trend in 1984. While economic growth
seems to be the major factor of debt reductions in Germany, the decline of interest
expenditures also played a signicant role in the Italian scal consolidation eorts.
For an assessment of scal consolidation episodes in the EU countries, see Afonso
(2010).
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Variables and data
A relevant issue with scal VARs is the choice of the variables that describe scal
policy and scal developments. In monetary policy VARs, the variable included in the
model is usually the central bank's key interest rate, a single variable that suciently
describes monetary policy. On the contrary, scal policy is hard to be described by a
single policy variable. For example, a discretionary increase in government revenues
may have a dierent macroeconomic impact depending on which taxes are increased
(labour versus consumption taxes), depending on whether a tax rate or the tax bases
are modied, etc. At the same time, if one is data restricted, as is usually the case,
it is not possible to build too extensive VAR models with an excessive number of
endogenous variables to describe scal policy.
In order to describe scal policy in the most aggregated form we preferred to work
with a parsimonious VAR structure and capture scal developments by only one vari-
able. Therefore, we used the government debt-to-GDP ratio because of the following
reasons. The debt ratio is a complex scal indicator that reects the developments
both in revenue and expenditure. The government debt ratio is usually not a policy
variable, since governments tend to concentrate on scal balance developments rather
than the development of stock of government debt when forming their policies (e.g.
government typically announce their targets in terms of scal decit improvements).
Moreover, the government debt ratio captures also the extraordinary government ac-
tions that may not be fully reected in the scal balance (e.g. purchase of nancial
assets, recapitalization of banking sector, the calling of previously issued government
guarantees or any stock-ow adjustments) and has thus in principle a wider coverage
of government actions than the scal balance. In addition, the debt ratio and its
dynamics is a key variable which determines scal sustainability.
The changes in the government debt ratio have an impact on the corporate sector
expectations, consumption sentiment of households and on nancial market condi-
tions, since it provides information not only about the current scal policy but about
past scal policies. Finally, the government debt ratio has a closer link to nancial
markets than the scal balance because it partly captures also the risk related to the
renancing of the outstanding stock of government debt, while inuencing as well
15interest rates.8
The other variables that we include in the VAR are the already mentioned FSI
(see next section for more details), GDP, the short-term interest rate and ination.
In some cases, and instead of the change in the debt ratio, we also used the budget
balance ratio itself for robustness. However, on quarterly basis such measure is more
dicult to construct for some countries than the debt ratio.9
Regarding the time span we use a quarterly dataset, for the U.S., the U.K.,
Germany and Italy, for the period 1980:4-2009:4. Again, for some cases, instead of
the FSI we also use alternative nancial variables for the threshold in order to allow
for a longer time span. The variables used in those cases were a measure of the
stock returns and the so-called TED spread (the dierence between the short-term
interbank interest rate and treasury bills rate). The sources and the details of these
variables are explained in Appendix A.3.
5.2 The Financial Stress Index
The nancial stress index (FSI) was developed by the IMF as an approximation to
potential instability of nancial markets (Cardarelli, Elekdag and Lall, 2009). The
FSI contains three main components: the bank related stress, the securities related
stress and the exchange rate stress: (i) Bank related stress: beta of banking sector
showing the perception of risk of the banking sector compared to other sectors in
the economy, the TED spread (dierence between the short-term interbank interest
rate and treasury bills rate) and the inverted term structure. (ii) Securities related
stress: corporate bond spread, stock market returns and stock-market volatility. (iii)
Exchange rate stress: exchange rate volatility. The FSI index is then constructed
as a sum of normalized value of all these sub-components. The larger value of the
FSI, the higher is the stress during each period. The authors have shown, that these
components are relatively uncorrelated and, importantly, adding dierent variable
does not change the resulting path of the FSI signicantly.10
Furthermore, the authors dened a binary variable identifying periods of signif-
icant stress that corresponds to all periods, where the FSI exceeds the band of 2
standard errors
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the nancial stress indicator for the U.S., the
U.K, Germany, and Italy.11
8In Appendix A.2 we illustrate the linkages between the change in the debt ratio and the budget
balance ratio for the countries under analysis.
9Naturally, the statistical concepts currently used in the EU (ESA 95 methodology) were not
available when scal policy was carried out in the 1980s or are not used in the US (where our
analysis focuses on federal debt). For example, certain scal operations (e.g. recapitalisations) or
entities (e.g. general government) are classied dierently than it would be the case of the concepts
used in the past.
10Regarding the exchange component we do not observe, for the cases of Germany and Italy, any
signicant changes around the adoption of the euro in 1999. Interestingly, for Italy, some relevant
volatility can be seen after the exiting of the Italian Lira and of the British Pound from the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism on September 1992.
11For instance, we could observe that periods of nancial stress are located around the NBER
16Cardarelli, Elekdag and Lall (2009) describe the eects of FSI and its sub-
components on output. Based on their ndings the most important eects on output
occur in the periods of nancial stress connected with the banking sector. Baxa, Hor-
vath and Vasicek (2010) studied the reaction of central bank ination targeting to
nancial stress using the framework of the augmented Taylor rule with time-varying
coecients. They found that the central banks normally do not react to nancial
stress, but their behaviour changes in times of large and longer stress such as the
Bank of England during the ERM crisis and the current crisis, for example.
5.3 VAR analysis
5.3.1 Testing the Threshold VAR model
We tested whether the data indicate the presence of a statistically signicant thresh-
old  as dened by the values of the nancial stress index, and whether the optimal
threshold values are reasonable in terms of identifying high and low stress periods
that will be related to output uctuations. Our estimated threshold values range
from 0.92 in case of Germany to 2.38 in case of the U.S. and the threshold is almost
always signicant with a p-value less than 0.0001 for all the Wald statistics.12 These
values are not far from the value of 2 proposed by Cardarelli, Elekdag and Lall (2009).
The threshold splits the sample into a high stress regime with about one fourth
of observations (from 24 to 39) and a low stress regime with the remaining portion.
Such division seems to be well in line with the fact that the duration of expansions is
higher than the duration of recessions. The number of observations of the high stress
regime makes the VAR model less parsimonious in this regime. To address possible
biases in our results, caused by the limited number of observations within the high
stress regime, we estimated the threshold VAR also for other variables representing
instability on nancial markets, whose time series went further back in time than the
FSI (available since the fourth quarter of 1980). These variables were: a measure of
stock returns, and the TED spread measuring the spread between the interest rate
on Eurodollar papers and treasury bills and for the U.S. also the spread between
the commercial paper rate and the treasury bills. To anticipate our results, these
experiments basically conrmed our main ndings about the eects of scal policy
in both regimes.
In Table 1 we report the estimated thresholds for each country, both using the
FSI indicator and alternative nancially related variables.
recessions in the U.S. except for the late 1980s.
12The optimal values are those that maximize the log determinant of residuals for all countries
except the U.K. where the value maximizing the Wald statistics was chosen. In this case, the
maximized log determinant of residuals implied a threshold equal to 0.2585, but the maximum Wald
statistics was for the threshold = 1.2369. The latter value is more in line with other countries and
leads to a similar share of observations in both regimes as in other countries.
17Table 1: Thresholds per country
N. observations
Threshold Estimated Sup- Avg- Exp- VAR Sample Low High
variable Threshold Wald Wald Wald order Stress Stress
United States
FSI 2.3822 100.85 62.11 47.11 1 1980Q4 - 2009Q4 88 24
TED 1.62 331.49 102.93 161.32 2 1971Q1 - 2009Q4 125 35
Stock Ret. -0.1622 166.64 138.97 78.54 2 1956Q1 - 2009Q4 147 67
United Kingdom
FSI 1.2369 179.65 109.37 85.81 2 1980Q4 - 2009Q3 81 29
TED 0.3143 200.86 132.12 96.58 1 1979Q1 - 2009Q3 92 29
Stock Ret. 1.2531 138.23 111.17 65.77 2 1978Q2 - 2009Q3 77 44
Germany
FSI 0.9167 121.63 94.81 57.75 2 1980Q4 - 2009Q4 77 39
Stock Ret. 1.3067 148.51 105.04 70.27 2 1979Q1 - 2009Q4 79 72
Italy
FSI 1.725 72.51 47.2 32.8 1 1980Q4 - 2009Q3 113 26
(0.016) (0.136) (0.016)
TED -0.4898 114.73 90.72 53.94 1 1979Q1 - 2009Q3 87 35
Notes: TED - spread between the short-term interbank interest rate and the treasury bills rate. Stock
returns: US - based on Dow Jones Industrial Index; UK - based on the Financial Times Stock Exchange
(FTSE) 100 index; Germany - based on the IMF IFS share prices indicator. p-values were always less than
0.0001, if not, their values are in parentheses.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Cardarelli et al. (2009) and the authors. 
195.3.2 The eects of scal shocks
Broadly, the responses of output growth to a scal shock are positive in both regimes
and in all countries in our sample, although in some cases the response is either
initially negative or uncertain within the rst few quarters after the shock.
Figure 3 reports the median impulse response functions of a scal policy shock,
both for a high and for a low nancial stress regime. We opted for the median impulse
response functions and the respective condence bands derived from the empirical
distribution of the responses rather than from the normal distribution due to the
lower number of observations namely in the higher stress regime sample.
In the U.S. the responses of output growth to an increase in the budget decit
are similar in terms of their peak eect in both regimes. However in the high stress
regime, the impulse response is negative in the rst quarter after the shock. On the
other hand, the increase in output growth is faster in comparison to the low stress
regime. The impulse response functions are signicant at 50%, in the high stress
regime after the 4 quarters. When the budget balance is used instead of the change of
the debt ratio in the threshold VAR, the results change only slightly. The response of
output to a scal shock does not have the initial small negative eect and it is always
positive. The low stress regime is dierent and the eect of a positive scal shock is
temporarily negative and it turns into a positive eect after three quarters. In this
specication the dierent behaviour is caused by a switch in contemporaneous terms
of the VAR: the FSI drops after a positive scal shock in the high stress regime, but
it temporarily increases in the low stress regime. Thus, our result that scal policy
eects are stronger in the high nancial stress regime survives this sensitivity check.13
In the United Kingdom, scal policy causes an increase in output growth when
the economy is in the low stress regime. However, the impulse response of output
in the high stress regime exhibits a similar pattern to the U.S., and initially output
growth decreases. This decrease lasts for six quarters and the 75% quantile of the
simulated impulse responses is even below zero (see Figure A.4.2 in Appendix A.4).
Contrary to the low stress regime, nancial stress does not decrease in response to a
scal shock in the high stress regime. Therefore, the impact of scal policy on output
growth seems to be initially larger in the low stress regime and also the peak of the
response of output occurs 4 quarters earlier than in the high stress regime.
For Germany, the eect of a positive scal policy shock on output is positive,
when the economy is in the high stress regime. The response of output in the low
stress regime is oscillating during the rst eight quarters from a positive to a negative
13For robustness, we also replaced the change in the debt ratio by a change in the debt itself and
the results were unchanged. We also used the rst dierences of GDP and of the price level together
with the budget balance. This was the only specication when a 1% scal shock had larger eects on
output growth in a higher stress regime than in the lower one. Again the amplitude of the impulse
response of output was reached earlier in the high stress regime than in the lower one. Furthermore
we estimated the eects of a very large shock of 5 standard deviation (SD) in the high stress regime,
corresponding to about 3.5% of GDP. The magnitude of the eect was roughly proportional to the 2
SD shock, but the peak was reached even faster, within 6 quarters after the shock (for a 2 SD shock
it was 8 quarters).
20impact, but then the response becomes positive. Table 2 reports multipliers conrm-
ing that scal policy has larger eects on output in the high stress regime than in the
low stress regime. The dierent responses in both regimes are caused by a number
of factors. First, the dynamics of the scal shock is dierent and somewhat increas-
ing endogenously after the initial shock in the high stress regime, and monotonously
decreasing in the low stress regime. Second, the nancial stress indicator reacts dif-
ferently. On the one hand, when the economy is in a high nancial stress regime, it
increases to a value above 1, and it is positive for the rst three periods and negative
afterwards. This explains the temporary decrease in the response of output growth.
In the low stress regime the nancial stress indicator decreases in a hump-shaped
pattern.14
The results for Italy show that notwithstanding the high level of government
debt, the responses of output to a scal shock follow the Keynesian pattern. In
both nancial stress regimes, the response of output is positive with a hump-shaped
pattern. In addition, in the high stress regime the eects of scal policy are twice as
large as in the low stress regime (see Appendix A.4). Moreover, scal policy shocks
initially and briey increase the nancial stress indicator in the high stress regime,
although in a longer horizon, from two to three years, the nancial stress decreases
by 0.3.
As far as the eects of the size of the scal shock are concerned, Figure 3 does not
provide evidence of important asymmetries between small and large shocks with the
exception of Germany. Moreover, one and two standard deviations shocks practically
coincide in the United States and in Italy. The eect of positive two standard devi-
ations shocks on output growth in the United Kingdom, in the high stress regime,
is slightly larger than proportional, with cumulative multipliers 0.301 and 0.242 re-
spectively for a two standard deviation (2SD) shock and for a one standard deviation
(1SD) shock.
When a negative scal shock is considered, responses coincide in the high stress
regime and only relatively smaller dierences arise in the low stress regime. Germany
is somewhat dierent. The impulse responses of positive scal shocks are slightly
dissimilar, but in terms of the cumulative multipliers over three years the dierences
are negligible. However, large scal contractions in the low stress regime lead to non-
proportionally larger eects on output and their cumulative multipliers are almost
twice the ones corresponding to small scal shocks.
We also provide evidence about the responses of nancial stress to scal shocks
(see Figure 4). The contemporaneous eect is positive in the high stress regime in
all countries but Germany, where it is close to zero. In the low stress regime the
contemporaneous eect is positive only in the United States, whereas in the other
countries it is close to zero. In response to a positive scal shock the nancial stress
decreases and then it returns back to zero.
Some additional points are worthwhile mentioning. First, a positive scal shock
14For example, a change in the debt ratio could reect eorts to reduce nancial stress, rather
than to stabilise economic output.
21leads to a temporary increase of nancial stress in Germany, but after few quarters the
path of FSI reverts and follows the scenario related to the low stress regime. Second,
the nancial stress indicator reacts only moderately in Italy, when the economy is in
the low stress regime.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the values of the multipliers for the responses of output
and FSI at one, two and three years after a scal shock, and also a cumulated response
over three years. The impulse responses are normalized to the same size of the initial
scal shock set to 1% of GDP for a direct comparison between two (High and Low
stress) regimes and dierent signs and sizes. We use one standard deviation (1SD)
and two standard deviations (2SD) as proxies for small and large shocks.
The size of scal multipliers varies across countries and across regimes. The
multipliers are largest in Italy with a size of the cumulative multiplier after three
years of about 0.82-0.87 for the high stress regime and 0.48-0.49 for the low stress
regime. In Germany the cumulative scal multiplier is 0.3 in the high stress regime
and almost zero when the economy is initially in the low stress regime, implying strong
crowding-out eects in the economy. The United States have cumulative multipliers
between 0.45-0.46 with minor dierences between signs and sizes of shock. The
United Kingdom has the lowest eects of a scal policy shock on output growth in
the high stress regime, with the cumulative multiplier over three years being between
0.22 and 0.3. Interestingly, if the scal shocks occur in the low nancial stress regime,
the cumulative multipliers are around 0.50-0.54.
22Table 2: Responses of output to a 1% of GDP scal shock
4 Quarters 8 Quarters 12 Quarters Cumulative (12 quarters)
2SD 1SD 2SD 1SD 2SD 1SD 2SD 1SD
United States
Positive Shock
High 0.103 0.105 0.193 0.194 0.153 0.157 0.449 0.456
Low 0.1 0.1 0.177 0.176 0.182 0.182 0.46 0.458
Negative Shock
High -0.101 -0.101 -0.19 -0.19 -0.155 -0.155 -0.445 -0.445
Low -0.1 -0.1 -0.177 -0.175 -0.182 -0.182 -0.459 -0.457
United Kingdom
Positive Shock
High -0.076 -0.091 0.103 0.087 0.275 0.246 0.301 0.242
Low 0.088 0.085 0.189 0.184 0.23 0.229 0.507 0.497
Negative Shock
High 0.097 0.097 -0.085 -0.085 -0.234 -0.234 -0.222 -0.222
Low -0.091 -0.085 -0.203 -0.186 -0.243 -0.229 -0.537 -0.5
Germany
Positive Shock
High 0.099 0.117 0.13 0.113 0.079 0.067 0.308 0.296
Low -0.039 -0.042 0.02 0.033 0.086 0.074 0.068 0.065
Negative Shock
High -0.051 -0.051 -0.085 -0.085 -0.082 -0.082 -0.218 -0.218
Low 0.037 0.041 -0.107 -0.065 -0.141 -0.091 -0.211 -0.115
Italy
Positive Shock
High 0.491 0.498 0.281 0.295 0.054 0.043 0.826 0.836
Low 0.248 0.244 0.193 0.19 0.053 0.049 0.494 0.483
Negative Shock
High -0.501 -0.501 -0.324 -0.324 -0.045 -0.045 -0.871 -0.871
Low -0.247 -0.244 -0.192 -0.187 -0.049 -0.048 -0.488 -0.479
23Table 3: Responses of nancial stress to a 1% of GDP scal shock
4 Quarters 8 Quarters 12 Quarters Cumulative (12 quarters)
2SD 1SD 2SD 1SD 2SD 1SD 2SD 1SD
United States
Positive Shock
High -0.371 -0.377 -0.399 -0.411 -0.228 -0.224 -0.998 -1.013
Low -0.428 -0.43 -0.475 -0.476 -0.313 -0.313 -1.215 -1.219
Negative Shock
High 0.376 0.377 0.403 0.411 0.232 0.224 1.01 1.013
Low 0.426 0.43 0.47 0.476 0.308 0.314 1.204 1.22
United Kingdom
Positive Shock
High 0.264 0.243 0.03 -0.039 0.179 0.073 0.473 0.276
Low -0.237 -0.245 -0.108 -0.129 0.086 0.062 -0.259 -0.311
Negative Shock
High -0.094 -0.243 0.076 0.039 -0.054 -0.073 -0.072 -0.276
Low 0.236 0.246 0.1 0.129 -0.085 -0.056 0.251 0.319
Germany
Positive Shock
High -0.622 -0.642 -0.448 -0.498 -0.11 -0.104 -1.18 -1.244
Low -0.781 -0.78 -0.397 -0.382 0.014 0.067 -1.164 -1.095
Negative Shock
High 0.635 0.642 0.533 0.498 0.138 0.104 1.306 1.244
Low 0.778 0.779 0.367 0.371 -0.129 -0.103 1.015 1.047
Italy
Positive Shock
High -0.288 -0.287 0.126 0.131 0.147 0.14 -0.014 -0.016
Low 0.032 0.041 0.133 0.136 0.138 0.134 0.303 0.31
Negative Shock
High 0.303 0.287 -0.155 -0.131 -0.16 -0.14 -0.013 0.016
Low -0.036 -0.044 -0.137 -0.136 -0.136 -0.134 -0.309 -0.313
24Figure 3: Fiscal Shock, Response of Output Growth
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25Figure 4: Fiscal Shock, Response of Financial Stress Indicator
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265.3.3 The eects of nancial stress shocks
The responses to a shock in the nancial stress indicator are in accordance with our
expectations. The eect on output is negative and it erodes after 6-10 periods, when
it temporarily becomes positive, namely in the U.K. and in Italy. As we can see in
Figure 5, there is some evidence of asymmetric reactions between large and small
shocks, and also between the two regimes. The impulse responses in Figure 5 were
rescaled to show the eects of an initial positive, one-unit shock to the nancial stress
index, if the overall shock had the size either of one or two standard deviations, to
allow a direct comparison among countries and regimes.
Figure 5: Responses of output to a Positive Shock in Financial Stress, High
and Low Regimes
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Note: The impulse responses were rescaled to the size of the shock of one unit of FSI. 
 
Table 4 reports the values of the impulse responses of output at dierent horizons.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the eect on output
growth of increased nancial stress is larger in the high stress regime than in the low
stress regime. In the high stress regime, the impact of a nancial stress shock is,
in principle, proportional to the size of the initial shock with an exception of large
increases in nancial stress in the U.S. and in the U.K. In these countries the output
falls more in response to increases in nancial stress by 2SD than by a 1SD increase
(the more detailed gures available in Appendix 4 show, that the eect of a 2SD shock
is about 2.5 times larger than a 1SD shock). The responses to decreases in nancial
27Table 4: The Eects on Output Growth and on the Debt Ratio of a Shock
in Financial Stress
4 Quarters 8 Quarters
+2 SD +1 SD -1 SD -2 SD +2 SD +1 SD -1 SD -2 SD
Output Growth
United High -0.366 -0.326 0.329 0.310 -0.102 -0.118 0.127 0.139
States Low -0.208 -0.175 0.166 0.161 -0.122 -0.106 0.105 0.106
United High -0.249 -0.193 0.191 0.137 -0.283 -0.227 0.221 0.156
Kingdom Low -0.161 -0.100 0.081 0.063 -0.134 -0.085 0.076 0.069
Germany High -0.239 -0.231 0.248 0.237 -0.094 -0.091 0.135 0.132
Low -0.130 -0.102 0.090 0.086 -0.123 -0.116 0.106 0.104
Italy High -0.100 -0.104 0.158 0.140 0.040 0.030 -0.023 -0.018
Low -0.136 -0.085 0.092 0.082 -0.030 -0.004 0.008 0.007
Change in Debt Ratio
United High 0.536 0.420 -0.401 -0.304 0.357 0.296 -0.290 -0.278
States Low 0.135 0.087 -0.067 -0.058 0.200 0.136 -0.124 -0.118
United High 0.735 0.632 -0.554 -0.397 0.907 0.773 -0.679 -0.531
Kingdom Low 0.249 0.123 -0.086 -0.057 0.337 0.195 -0.155 -0.133
Germany High 0.087 0.098 -0.137 -0.140 0.081 0.083 -0.112 -0.108
Low 0.097 0.146 -0.164 -0.175 0.064 0.086 -0.085 -0.081
Italy High 0.166 0.142 -0.208 -0.158 0.080 0.073 -0.110 -0.109
Low 0.146 0.061 -0.072 -0.057 0.134 0.029 -0.036 -0.028
Note: The
impulse responses were rescaled to the size of the shock of one unit of FSI.
stress are in principal proportional to a +1SD shock except in the U.K. at both
horizons. In this case, the impact on output growth of decreasing the nancial stress
by 2SD is less than proportional. Similarly to Figure 5, we have rescaled the values
to a one-unit initial shock (positive and negative), hence we have similar (absolute)
values for +/- 1 and 2 SD shocks indicate proportionality in signs and sizes.
The dierences among the eects of dierent shocks are more pronounced in
the low stress regime, where the eect of a positive 2SD shock in nancial stress is
more than proportional in all countries. This suggest a possibility that the economy
is more likely to fall into a recession after a nancial stress shock, if initially a low
stress regime is in place. On the contrary, output increases proportionally in response
to reductions in the stress indicator in all countries except in the U.K., where the
eect on output growth of an additional decrease in the nancial stress measure is
minor.
In line with this asymmetry in the response of output growth, the debt ratio rises
after a positive shock in the FSI in both regimes (Figure 6). Generally, these increases
are non-proportionally larger for a 2SD positive shock in comparison to a 1SD shock.
On the other hand, improvements of the conditions in the nancial markets decrease
government debt, but the dierence between a -1SD and a -2SD is rather small. The
only exception is Germany, where the increase of the nancial stress indicator by a
1SD and a 2SD causes a similar increase in debt when the economy is initially in the
low stress regime. In the case of a high stress regime, the eects of nancial stress
shocks seem to be proportional both in sign and in size (further results are provided
in Appendix A.5).
28Figure 6: Responses of Debt to a Positive Shock in Financial Stress, High
and Low Regimes
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5.3.4 Responses over time
Nonlinear impulse responses depend not only on the estimated model coecients but
also on initial conditions, i.e. whether the economy is in the high nancial stress
regime at the time of the scal shock or not. Likewise, the impulse responses depend
also on the entire history of the variables. For example, the persistence of nancial
stress, as well as its size, might aect the ability of scal policy to accomplish a switch
from a high stress regime back to a low stress regime.
In the previous sections we presented the overall nonlinear impulse responses de-
rived as the full sample average median impulse responses over both regimes. How-
ever, the fact, that nonlinear impulse responses are simulated for each point in time,
allows us to investigate the time variation in the scal shock eects even in a model
with constant parameters in the two regimes. For instance, for the U.S., the nan-
cial stress periods of the 80's and 90's are associated with lower impulse responses,
contrary to periods without stress (1981, 1987-1988, 1990).
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of output growth to an initial 1 percentage
point of GDP debt increase for three periods: 1981Q3-1989Q4, 1990Q1-1999Q4 and
2000Q1-2009Q4 in all countries. Broadly, the eects of scal policy on output growth
in the high nancial stress regime are larger within the rst two and half years, after
29the shock, than in the low stress regime after 2000 in all countries but the United
Kingdom. However, the initially larger eect is oset either by lower persistence of
the eect (in the United States) or the impact on output growth becomes negative
in the long term as in Germany and to some extent in Italy as well. Otherwise
the evidence of a larger positive impact of scal policy on output growth in times
of higher nancial stress is weak and country specic. This can also be seen from
Table 5 that shows the peak multipliers corresponding to impulse responses (from
the Figures and Tables in Appendix A.6, notably for the multipliers at horizons of
one, two and three years after the shock; and Figure A.6.5 illustrating time variation
with 3D plots).
Figure 7: Time variation of nonlinear impulse responses (high and low
nancial stress regimes): response of GDP to an initial 1 percentage point












































































In the U.S., the dierence in the impact of scal policy on output in the low
nancial stress regime is negligible across periods with peak multipliers ranging from
0.182 to 0.187. When the nancial stress was above the threshold, the multipliers
were slightly lower in the 1980's and in the 1990's with values respectively of 0.174 and
0.176. Hence, the eect of scal policy on output growth was actually lower in periods
30Table 5: Peak multipliers for the response of output to a scal shock
Financial
stress regimes 1980s 1990s 2000s
United States High 0.174 0.176 0.237
Low 0.182 0.187 0.187
United Kingdom High 0.395 0.211 0.204
Low 0.398 0.155 0.148
Germany High 0.129 0.166 0.417
Low 0.152 0.114 0.223
Italy High 0.403 0.517 0.657
Low 0.346 0.269 0.207
with high stress than with low stress. In the last decade the situation was reversed.
For the rst three quarters the eect of scal policy is still below the impulse response
of the low stress regime, but then it increases and the peak multiplier reaches 0.237
earlier than two years after the shock. However, the impact of a scal policy shock
is not that persistent and returns to zero slightly faster in the high nancial stress
regime. A more detailed analysis of the simulated impulse responses in the post 2000
decade shows that scal policy became more eective in the periods of higher stress,
which matches the 2001 recession and the 2008-2009 crisis. The peaks of the impulse
responses starting in early 2001 were the largest of the entire sample. The impulse
responses associated with starting points in 2008-2009 are depicted in Appendix A.6.
The sharpest fall in the size of the scal multiplier occurred in the United Kingdom
where it fell, in the low stress regime, from 0.398 in the eighties to 0.148 in the last
decade, and from 0.395 to 0.204 in the high stress regime. We should note that
this decrease in the size of the multipliers started in 1989 during a period of scal
consolidation. In the case of the U.S. the multipliers remained lower than average
during the 2008-2009 crisis as well.
In Germany, the impulse responses of output growth to a scal policy shock are
relatively consistent in the 1980s and in the 1990s in the low stress regime. The
impact was uncertain for the rst two years after the shock with oscillations between
positive and negative values, with a peak occurring more than three years after the
shock. The high stress regime shows dierent patterns when comparing these two
decades. In the 1980s, a scal policy shock increased output growth by a small margin
(peaking just after two quarters at 0.129), but these positive eects quickly turned
negative. On the other hand, in the 1990s the eects of a debt increase were larger
and persistent. After 2000, the eect of a scal shock is uncertain for the rst year
after the shock but then it jumps up to 0.223 in the low nancial stress periods and
to 0.417 in the high stress periods. Such positive eect lasts up to 12-15 quarters
after the shock and then both impulse responses turn into negative values.
31The impact of scal policy on output growth has a hump-shaped pattern in Italy
and it is consistent over time and across regimes. In this case, throughout time the
size of the peak multiplier decreased in the low nancial stress regime, from 0.346
to 0.207, and the opposite holds for the high stress regime, where it increased from
0.403 to 0.657. As far as the 2008-2009 crisis is concerned, both Italy and Germany
depict impulse responses suggesting larger than average impacts on output growth
in 2008 but in 2009 sizes of scal multipliers decreased.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the interactions between scal and nancial developments
in times of nancial instability. The eects of scal policy were estimated using a
threshold vector autoregression with macro, scal and nancial variables and with
regime switching determined by a measure of nancial stress. The application of a
nonlinear framework with regime switching is motivated by the debate on the ability
of scal policy to shorten recessions and to facilitate a subsequent recovery, and
its empirical adequacy was conrmed by formal nonlinearity test in TVAR model.
Furthermore, the identied periods of nancial stress are also characterised by lower
output growth and in a number of cases coincide with recessions.
To evaluate the impact of both scal developments and nancial instability on
output growth, a set of nonlinear impulse response functions were estimated. Unlike
their linear counterparts, nonlinear impulse responses are dierences between the
simulated paths of endogenous variables with and without an initial shock, either in
scal policy or in nancial stress conditions. Given its nature, this approach allows
to take into account future regime switches caused by a shock on any endogenous
variable and not only on nancial stress, which determines the alternative regimes in
our model. The other advantage is that the framework of nonlinear impulse responses
can be used to recover time variance in impulse responses.
The empirical results and the implications of our model are threefold. First, the
dierences among the scal multipliers of various sizes and signs of shocks are small in
all countries. However, the initial state of the economy matters and both multipliers
and the estimated responses to scal shocks dier across regimes. The results are
also quite country specic. The dierence between the high and low nancial stress
regimes is lowest in the United States, but the peak of the response is reached earlier
in the high stress regime compared to the low stress regime. Moreover, scal policy
shocks have a larger eect on output growth in both Euro area countries, Germany
and Italy, although the multipliers for Germany are lower. On the other hand, in the
United Kingdom, the multipliers are much lower in the high nancial stress regime.
Second, the ability of scal policy to aect output growth evolved over time.
Indeed, the scal multipliers increased since the 1990's in the high stress regime in
all countries except in the United Kingdom where they were stable. The multipliers
associated to the responses with initial conditions in the low nancial stress regime
decreased over time in the United Kingdom and in Italy, remained stable in the
32United States, and increased in Germany.
Third, nancial stress has strong negative eects on output growth and its eects
are also nonlinear. The negative eect is largest in the high stress regime, but it
is still rather proportional, and the dierence between small and large increases of
nancial stress is small. In the low stress regime, output growth falls much more in
response to a large increase in nancial stress suggesting an increased probability of
a shift in the regime.
Therefore, we have found in our dataset the evidence of nonlinearities in the eects
of a scal shock depending on the initial conditions, determined by the existence of
nancial stress, diverse levels of government indebtedness, and, of course, implicitly
assumed dierent monetary policy behaviour. In addition, both the multipliers and
the nature of these nonlinearities vary across countries and evolve over time.
Finally, one should also note that since the Financial Stress Index captures three
dierent forms of nancial stress: the banking, securities, and exchange rate related
stress, the transmission mechanism of scal developments may work dierently de-
pending on the form of stress. In particular, the impact of scal policy in a period
of bank stress may dier from the impact under an exchange rate stress depending
also on the economy's openness.
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A Appendix
A.1 Algorithm to compute nonlinear impulse responses
1. The shocks for the periods from 0 to q are drawn from the residuals of the
estimated VAR model.
2. For each initial value this sequence of shocks is fed through the model to produce
forecasts conditional on initial conditions.
3. Repeat step 2) with the initial shock into one variable equal to +/- 1 or 2 SD
to get forecasts if there was an initial shock.
4. The dierence between the forecasts from step 2 and 3 is the impulse response
function. Repeat this 500-times and derive an average impulse response for this
particular initial condition
5. Repeat steps 2-4 for each initial conditions. Final impulse responses are average
impulse responses over initial conditions of each regime. Condence bands
derived from quantiles of empirical distribution. We use a 50% condence
bands here.
37A.2 Fiscal data compared




















































































































































































































































































Note: inverted scale for the change in the debt ratio.
Sources: AMECO database (annual budget balance data) and national central banks (quarterly
government debt data).
38A.3 Data description and sources
Variables in Threshold VAR
yt GDP, annual growth rate of the log of the real GDP (Y) used: Yt = log(Yt)   log(Yt 4).
pt Price level (P), annual growth rate of logs used: pt = log(Pt)   log(Pt 4).
it Short-term interest rate.
ft Annual change in the debt to GDP ratio: ft = Dt   Dt 4.
st Financial stress index.
Financial stress variables
FSI (sum of subsequent components).
Bank stress (normalized beta of stocks of banking sector + normalized TED spread
+ normalized inverted term structure).





Nominal GDP: IMF IFS (IFS.Q.111.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$).
GDP deator: IMF IFS (IFS.Q.111.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$).
Interest rate: Federal funds rate, FRED, series FEDFUNDS.
Government debt: Federal Debt held by the Public, FRED, series FYGFDPUN.
Stock prices: Dow Jones Industrial Index, quarterly averages.
TED spread: Spread between treasury bills rate (3M) and interbank interest rate
represented by the Eurodollar 3M rate, IMF IFS.
39United Kingdom
Nominal GDP: IMF IFS (IFS.Q.112.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$),
rolling sum of 4 quarters to calculate the annual GDP.
GDP deator: IMF IFS (IFS.Q.112.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$).
Interest rate: End of quarter Sterling interbank lending rate, 1 month, average;
Bank of England, series IUQVNEA.
Government debt: Since 2000 Quarterly Government Debt (Maastricht Debt) for General
Government, Eurostat; older data from other sources, merged using growth
values in overlapping periods (Public sector debt, National Statistics,
series BKQK; Quarterly amounts outstanding of General Government sterling
and all foreign currency consolidated gross debt total (in sterling millions),
Bank of England, series DPQG004).
Stock prices: Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index - Historical close,
end of period, UK pound sterling, provided by DataStream.
TED spread: Spread between treasury bills rate (3M) and interbank interest rate
represented by LIBOR 3M rate, IMF IFS.
Germany
Nominal GDP: Federal Statistical Oce, DeStatis, National Accounts, Gross Domestic
Product since 1970, Quarterly and Annual Data. The time series before
the German Unication was rescaled to the post-unication period using
growth rates of quarterly data that overlap in 1991. The GDP deator
was calculated as the ratio of nominal and real GDP
(available as index of 2000=100 only), rescalled to the post unication
period using quarterly growth rates as well.
CPI: IMF IFS (IFS.Q.134.6.64).
Interest rate: Money market rates reported by Frankfurt banks,
monthly average of overnight money.
Government debt: Statistische Angaben: Umrechnungsart: Endstand, Euro, Millionen,
Bundesbank. SeriesBQ1710, BQ1720, Central, state and local government debt;
Total debt (excluding hospitals).
Stock prices: Share prices, IMF IFS.
Italy
Nominal GDP: OECD (OEO.Q.ITA.GDP).
GDP deator: IMF IFS (OEO.Q.ITA.PGDP).
Interest rate: money market rate, IMF IFS.
Government debt: General Government debt, Banca d'Italia.
Stock prices: Share prices, IMF IFS.
40A.4 Eects of Fiscal Policy Shock
Figure A.4.1: Eects of the Fiscal Policy Shock in the U.S. (+/- 1,2SD
shock, High vs. Low Stress Regime)










1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
+2SD +1 SD -1 SD -2 SD









1 3 5 7 91 11 31 51 71 92 12 32 5
+2SD +1 SD -1 SD -2 SD
 











1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
+2 SD +1 SD -1 SD -2 SD







1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
+2 SD +1 SD -1 SD -2 SD
 







1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
+2 SD +1 SD -1 SD -2 SD









1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
+2 SD +1 SD -1 SD -2 SD
 
 
41Figure A.4.2: Eects of the Fiscal Policy Shock in the U.K. (+/- 1,2SD
shock, High vs. Low Stress Regime)
  47
Figure A4.2 – Effects of the Fiscal Policy Shock in the U.K.  
(+/-1,2SD shock, High vs. Low Stress Regime) 
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42Figure A.4.3: Eects of the Fiscal Policy Shock in Germany (+/- 1,2SD
shock, High vs. Low Stress Regime)
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43Figure A.4.4: Eects of the Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy (+/- 1,2SD shock,
High vs. Low Stress Regime)
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44Figure A.4.5: Distribution of the Responses of Output to Fiscal Policy Shock
(+/- 1 SD shock)
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45A.5 Eects of shock in FSI
Figure A.5.1: Financial Stress Shock (+/- 1,2SD shock, High vs. Low
Regime), U.S.
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46Figure A.5.2: Financial Stress Shock (+/- 1,2SD shock, High vs. Low
Regime), U.K.
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Figure A5.2 – Financial Stress Shock (+/-1,2SD shock, High vs. Low Regime), UK  
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47Figure A.5.3: Financial Stress Shock (+/- 1,2SD shock, High vs. Low
Regime), Germany
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48Figure A.5.4: Financial Stress Shock (+/- 1,2SD shock, High vs. Low
Regime), Italy
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49A.6 Impulse Reponses of Output to Fiscal Shock, sub-samples
Table A.6.1: Multipliers at selected horizons, for the response of output to
a scal shock
Regimes 1981Q3:1989:Q4 1990Q1:1999Q4 2000Q1:2009Q4
4Q 8Q 12Q 4Q 8Q 12Q 4Q 8Q 12Q
United High 0.084 0.168 0.16 0.076 0.161 0.175 0.139 0.233 0.145
States Low 0.099 0.172 0.18 0.101 0.177 0.184 0.1 0.178 0.184
United High -0.02 0.211 0.375 0.076 0.161 0.175 -0.03 0.096 0.176
Kingdom Low 0.126 0.307 0.398 0.101 0.177 0.184 0.066 0.124 0.145
Germany High 0.034 -0.11 -0.058 0.108 0.166 0.075 0.044 0.417 0.116
Low -0.041 0.046 0.152 -0.049 0.003 0.112 0.013 0.195 0.162
Italy High 0.403 0.294 0.083 0.517 0.24 0.024 0.573 0.294 0.003
Low 0.307 0.31 0.076 0.257 0.204 0.045 0.207 0.116 0.029
Table A.6.2: Peak multipliers, for the response of output to a scal shock:
the 2008-2009 recession
2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 average
United States 0.268 0.289 0.263 0.23 0.2 0.181 0.18 0.189
United Kingdom 0.286 0.221 0.212 0.217 0.187 0.121 0.279
Germany 0.392 0.367 0.342 0.228 0.192 0.185 0.212 0.139
Italy 0.81 1.031 1.097 0.536 0.308 0.228 0.505
50Figure A.6.1: Impulse responses of output to an initial 1% GDP debt in-
crease, U.S.
1981Q3 - 1989Q4
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51Figure A.6.2: Impulse responses of output to an initial 1% GDP debt in-
crease, U.K.
1981Q3 - 1989Q4
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52Figure A.6.3: Impulse responses of output to an initial 1% GDP debt in-
crease, Germany
1981Q3 - 1989Q4
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53Figure A.6.4: Impulse responses of output to an initial 1% GDP debt in-
crease, Italy
1981Q3 - 1989Q4
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54Figure A.6.5: Median impulse responses of 1% scal shock over time
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